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There is extensive evidence that, over the past two decades, non-gov-
ernment organisations have taken on a dramatically significant role in
the Australian welfare state, as governments increasingly fund them to
deliver human services. Mark Considine argues that this trend in Aus-
tralia ‘can be viewed as the most important and most radical change
to state–society relations since the advent of the modern welfare state’
(2003, p. 63). This chapter explores this development in an effort to con-
sider how not-for-profit welfare services have come to be positioned in
the marketisation agenda that this collection seeks to capture.
The organisations discussed in this chapter are variously referred
to elsewhere as non-government organisations (to specify separateness
from government); third sector organisations (to specify a distinctive-
ness from two other sectors, the market and the state); civil society or-
ganisations (to specify a basis in associations formed voluntarily, rather
than through the family, state or market) and community sector or-
ganisations (to specify a concern with local or particularised needs). In
this chapter, the relationship of these organisations with government,
with the market, with civil society and with ‘the community’ is brought
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into question. As such, the term not-for-profits (NFPs) is utilised. Thus
the defining characteristics of the organisations under discussion are 1)
that they do not seek to distribute profits and 2) they seek to provide
a range of public goods and services (taken, partially, from Casey &
Dalton 2006, p. 25). Here then, their distinctiveness hinges on the com-
mon feature that they are not, as Davidson puts it, ‘in it for the money’
(Davidson 2009, p. 65). While ‘the NFP sector’ encompasses a huge di-
versity of organisations, including sporting, hobby and cultural groups,
this chapter focuses on NFPs that provide human services.
However, there are important differences within the category of
NFP human services: between organisations constituted as charities,
and those constituted as incorporated associations; between those with
a religious auspice and those founded in social movement, consumer
rights or self-help activities; between the very large and the very small;
between the highly bureaucratised and those with quite ad hoc admin-
istrative structures; and between those with a single service focus and
those that work across a range of human services. Indeed, part of the
narrative in this chapter concerns the way ‘the NFP sector’ has been
historically produced as a unified category of services through marketi-
sation processes.
In 2010, the Productivity Commission found that not-for-profit
organisations were the major providers in most human service areas
across Commonwealth, state and territory government agencies and
that there were around 20,000 non-profit organisations in the humans
services sector that relied on government for their main source of fund-
ing. The Productivity Commission also reported that total government
funding to non-profit human services had increased from $10.1 bil-
lion in 1999–2000 to $25.5 billion in 2006–7 (Productivity Commission
2010, pp. 300–62). By way of contrast, research conducted in 1995 by
the Industry Commission identified some 11,000 ‘community sector
social welfare organisations’ that were receiving government funding,
and most of the organisations identified employed fewer than five staff
(Industry Commission 1995). These data establish that the NFP human
services sector in Australia is substantial and that government funding
to it has increased exponentially over the past two decades.
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Historical threads to NFP welfare sector expansion
In Australia, NFPs have historically played a role in maintaining the
welfare of citizens, intervening where the market and the family have
failed them. Prior to nationhood and throughout the early and
mid-20th century, charities and mutual aid societies provided the ma-
jority of social services. In the case of charities, these activities were
sustained by support from religious organisations, some government
grants and subsidies, and donations from the public (Berman et al.
2006). Many of the charities were church-based, fragmented along sec-
tarian lines and, in addition to providing public goods, were ‘partly
motivated by competition for souls’ (Murphy 2006, p. 44.10). Mutual
aid societies, such as the friendly societies, developed along self-help
lines, and provided insurance and services to group members and their
families. Paul Smyth (2008) suggests that NFPs were historically located
outside of government and relied on a culture of voluntarism. Indeed,
Leslie Chenoweth claims that, in Australia, governments have histor-
ically distanced themselves actively from funding and providing ser-
vices, favouring a culture of ‘Australian self-reliance’ (2008, p. 54).
Extensive public funding for human services to replace the ‘some-
what haphazard coverage of voluntary organisations’ (Fawcett et al.
2010, p. 99) did not really emerge until the postwar period when, as
Smyth suggests, ‘there came a point when Australia needed a welfare
state’ (2008, p. 215). For example, throughout the 1960s state govern-
ments (with the exception of Victoria) began establishing large welfare
departments, taking on the work of the voluntary Child Protection So-
cieties (Lamont & Bromfield 2010). However, a similar consolidation of
state responsibility for service delivery, based in principles of univer-
sality, entitlement and professionalism did not occur in the full range
of personal social services, as was the case, for example, in the United
Kingdom. Even during the 1970s, when state funding of social services
escalated significantly, the overall model of a mixed economy of welfare
did not alter much. In the Australian welfare state, government provi-
sion of community services ‘developed slowly, in a sketchy, residualised
and uneven manner’ (Harris & McDonald 2000, p. 54).
Berman and colleagues’ (2006) detailed history of funding to two
of the major NFP organisations on the contemporary welfare services
landscape, the Brotherhood of St Laurence (BSL) and the Salvation
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Army, illustrates the Australian mixed economy model in practice from
the postwar period on. For example, in the 1950s, under the Aged
Person’s Home Act 1954, these church-based organisations were encour-
aged by the Commonwealth government (through matching funds for
capital expenditure) to build and operate accommodation for the aged.
In the 1970s, they were funded by the Commonwealth government to
provide labour market programs to deal with growing unemployment,
and during the 1970s and the 1980s they received government ‘project
funding’ for poverty alleviation programs (particularly for the elderly
and low-income families), community development projects, unem-
ployment services, emergency and crisis accommodation services, al-
cohol and drug treatment programs, and domestic violence services.
Children’s services were another major service area where governments
funded NFPs (although in this case, not the BSL or the Salvation Army)
to provide services, including funding for orphanages and institutions
for children with disabilities.
In the 1970s and 1980s an array of new NFP organisations ap-
peared on the social policy landscape. In what Anna Yeatman (1990)
called the ‘democratic-participative’ era in Australian public adminis-
tration, new social movements politicised a new range of social needs:
women’s rights, consumer rights, environmental issues, disability
rights, gay and lesbian issues, migrant rights and so forth. These move-
ments made claims on the state, both for government services (such
as legal aid offices1 and community health centres) and for funding for
community-based organisations to provide services (such as commu-
nity legal centres, women’s health centres, neighbourhood centres and
refuges). What is distinctive about the advocacy of these movements
is that they were claiming not just a redistribution of resources, but
the democratisation of state institutions and practices: service delivery
models were pitched as an alternative to professionalised, bureaucra-
tised, and disempowering models of welfare bureaucracy (see, for ex-
1 The Legal Aid Commissions in the states and territories were established
between the 1970s and 1990s. However, in NSW, the first Legal Assistance Act was
passed in 1943, and this established the Public Solicitors Office. On its website,
NSW Legal Aid state that it was at this point that ‘Legal aid was no longer a charity
but a social right. It was the first time in the western world that lawyers were
employed to give legal aid to low income earners’.
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ample, Broom 1991; Weeks 1994). But the new organisations were also
established as an alternative to the traditional NFPs, the charities. Social
movements were particularly critical of the historical role that charities
had played in determining citizens as deserving or undeserving of ser-
vice, and also of the reliance on religiously motivated volunteers and
faith-based analyses of social problems. Martin Painter (1992) argues
that government responded to the new social movement organisations
with an official discourse of participation. Christine Everingham (2003)
suggests that what emerged was a state-sponsored community sector
that was quite distinct from the charity sector.
However, in the early 1990s, the state-sponsored community sector
lost much of its legitimacy. Public choice discourses contributed a ra-
tionale for the de-funding of services provided by women’s groups,
environment groups and migrant rights groups (Fawcett et al. 2010).
Public choice proponents argued that many of the NFP groups actively
involved in the delivery of community-based services not only failed to
reflect the public good, but also seriously distorted social policy by pro-
moting ‘special interests’ over the interests of the general community
and, in some cases, building ‘service empires’ for themselves. They had
‘captured the state’. In addition, the rise of managerialism and economic
rationalism in public administration rendered community-based NFPs
vulnerable in the new efficiency paradigm. The development of techno-
cratic approaches to public sector program planning and resource allo-
cation, referred to as the ‘new public management’ (NPM), demanded
that funded services demonstrate measurable outcomes. This entailed a
broad shift from grants and project funding to output-based funding.
The new financing models involved new data collection requirements,
new standards of professionalisation and new organisational structures.
For many organisations, accountability mechanisms were undeveloped
and some activities (such as advocacy, democratisation and empower-
ment) were hard to measure, and these new frameworks were intro-
duced ‘without the necessary funding investment in agencies to fulfill
their obligations’ (Inglis & Rogan 1993, p. 7). The dual affronts of public
choice discourse and NPM significantly undermined the ‘self evident
worth’ (Harries 1993, p. 193) of community-based organisations. ‘Per-
formance management’ was the beginning of the application of ‘market
discipline’ to the state-sponsored community sector that, in turn, laid
the foundations for the marketisation of NFPs more generally.
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NFPs and the marketisation of human services: contractualism
and outsourcing
Throughout the 1990s, the public sector reforms focused on ensuring
that market principles applied to the public sector involved inducing
competition between all types of service providers – public sector, for-
profit and not-for-profit – for government funding. Competition, it was
argued, would mean that government expenditure on service provision
would be based on principles such as cost effectiveness and productivity
rather than traditional bureaucratic decision-making processes. How-
ever, valorising competition in decision-making processes in this way
also implicitly de-legitimised the new social movement goal of more
democratised public decision-making. Competition positions service
delivery as an output of policy that has already been decided. This con-
trasts significantly with the ideals of community-based human service
organisations as social policy-in-action and of a more diffuse and de-
volved social democracy.
Competition was to be fostered through the contracting out of
services, and non-government organisations were to tender for govern-
ment contracts. This approach is referred to as the ‘purchaser–provider
split’, in which the role of government is conceptualised as primarily
the buyer (steerer), rather than the provider (rower) of public services.
According to Dalton and colleagues (1996, p. 100), the
purchaser–provider split was ‘supposed to allow governments to dis-
tance themselves from the day-to-day operation of services … by con-
tracts or contracting out services’. The centrality of contractual arrange-
ments in these reforms led some public policy analysts to refer to a shift
to ‘the contract state’ or ‘New Contractualism’ (Dalton et al. 1996; Davis
1997; Sidoti et al. 2009; Yeatman 1995). Commenting on this shift in the
1990s, Glyn Davis (1997, p. 217) argued that in the emerging contract
regime:
[m]uch bureaucratic attention is on monitoring performance of dis-
tant contractors, and regulating private markets … however the price
of supervising and enforcement – the transaction costs of contract-
ing – can sometimes overwhelm any financial benefit. Yet the drive
towards contracts is on across Australia, a triumph of hope over ex-
perience.
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A common theme in narratives of the marketisation of human services
in Australia is privatisation through ‘outsourcing’. The now iconic ex-
ample of the outsourcing program involved the delivery of services to
unemployed people. (In 2001, an OECD report called the Job Network
a ‘radical transformation of employment service delivery … without
parallel in OECD countries’ (2001, p. 262).) Until 1998, publicly funded
employment services for job-seekers had been delivered by the Com-
monwealth Employment Service (CES), a public sector agency. In 1998,
the CES was replaced by the Job Network, a network of 300 public, pri-
vate and not-for-profit providers. Aulich (2011, p. 208) describes the
move in terms of privatisation, explaining Minister Amanda Vanstone’s
rationale for outsourcing in the following way:
Vanstone argued that a privatised service would cost less, give more
choice and personalised services to job-seekers and would be better
for employers. Private providers would be paid on the basis of out-
comes, to drive down costs and drive up labour market participation.
In the second round of contracts in 2000, the network had reduced to
197 providers, consisting almost exclusively of for-profit and not-for-
profit organisations. Reflecting on the development of Job Network, the
then Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations, Tony Abbott,
explained:
As the purchaser but not provider of employment services, the Gov-
ernment has created what might best be described as a ‘social market’
– a competitive market which exists because government has sum-
moned it in to being. In this sense, the Job Network is an ‘arm’ of
government and Job Network members are the government’s part-
ners and allies in so far as they are bound to one another in the
delivery of services the public has come to expect (2003, p. 200).
Outsourcing of human services by governments has continued apace.
By 2014 the employment services sector, which had been renamed
Job Services Australia by the Rudd Labor government in 2009, con-
sisted only of NFPs and for-profit-providers. Australian governments
outsource homelessness services, personal and family services, drug
and alcohol services and services for people with disabilities and for
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older people. Most recently in the state of New South Wales (NSW)
the government has transferred a significant amount of public housing
to community housing providers and has committed to transferring
the majority of out-home-care (foster care) services to non-government
providers by 2022 (Legislative Assembly of NSW 2013). As the data
provided in the Introduction show, the majority of providers that gov-
ernments outsource human services to are NFPs.
The Third Way?
An important hinge in the expansion of the NFP sector’s role in human
service delivery has been the deployment of Third Way ideas. The Third
Way can be traced to communitarian visions of the role of the state,
particularly in the work of Anthony Giddens, which were taken up and
applied in the United Kingdom by the Blair Labor government and pro-
moted in Australia by Labor Party politicians such as Mark Latham. A
central plank of the Third Way is the devolution of social services to
local community groups and associations. Giddens, for example, sug-
gested going beyond the welfare state to develop a ‘social investment
state’, or a ‘positive welfare society’ by altering the balance between the
forms of welfare support government provides directly and those that
emerge out of the ‘third sector’, or community-based organisations and
associations (Giddens 1998, p. 117). Crucial to the logic of Third Way
politics was a construction of the welfare state as disabling – as cum-
bersome, inefficient and unresponsive to the community (see Botsman
& Latham 2001). Interestingly, Third Way ideas have also been attrac-
tive to conservative parties elsewhere, and to Coalition governments in
Australia. Tony Abbott, for example, claimed that ‘the Third Way may
have actually come further in Howard’s Australia than in Blair’s Britain’
(2003, p. 204).
NFPs have been able to work with Third Way ideas to justify their
position in welfare markets. By way of example, in its submission to
the Productivity Commission’s study of the contribution of the not-
for-profit sector, the peak organisation for Australian non-government
community services, ACOSS (2009, pp. 2–3), prefaced their recom-
mendations with a list of ‘10 key features and benefits of a strong,
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diverse and effective not-for profit community services and welfare sec-
tor’. The list included statements such as:
The sector is mission driven rather than market driven. This means
that surpluses are reinvested back to provide a dividend for commu-
nity stakeholders, rather than individual shareholders...
The sector can be more responsive to previously unrecognized
needs resulting from market or government failure...
An ability to respond holistically and flexibly ... Such responsive-
ness and flexibility cannot be guaranteed by contracted commercial
services and probably not by more bureaucratic and siloed govern-
ment structures.
Participation and representation of clients in management
structures, program development and delivery can be empowering
and lead to more effective outcomes...
Meaningful community involvement in, and responsibility for,
providing community services is an important tool for weaving com-
munity cohesiveness. This can serve as a safeguard against some
parts of our society becoming marginalized and alienated.
So, while economic rationalism, managerialism, contractualism and
outsourcing disciplined the activities of the NFP sector, it certainly did
not kill it off. Indeed, the more intense marketisation of human ser-
vices that has continued into the 21st century created a new space for
NFPs in newly legitimised welfare markets. This special place has been
justified by governments and by NFPs alike through reference to his-
torical legacy (that is, that NFPs had a longstanding involvement in
humans service provision), social purpose (that is, that NFPs are driven
by altruism rather than profit) and market competitiveness (that is, that
NFPs could provide cheaper and better services).
Bringing the charities back in
Importantly, the NFP space is inclusive of charities and of community
sector organisations, who champion their value in similar ways: by con-
trasting themselves to both government and for-profit human service
providers. There is some evidence that the larger Christian charities
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benefitted from their religious identity under the conservative Howard
government (1996–2007), as it made significant references to the values
and role of such organisations in addressing human need and social
problems throughout its term (Phillips 2007). Further, an analysis of
state departments of community services spending demonstrates that,
apart from the major secular NGOs, such as the Red Cross, the Benev-
olent Society and Barnardos Australia, the larger faith-based NGOs
gained the largest contracts for the delivery of major state services. For
example, in NSW in 2010–11, 101 NFP agencies were funded to de-
liver services in the key human service area of ‘family and individual
support’. Grants started at $12,000, but the large faith-based agencies
typically received total funds of more than $500,000 each, with some
receiving grants of more than $2.5 million (Family and Community
Services 2011).
Many of the charities have expanded on the basis of status as pre-
ferred welfare providers in the market in welfare services, although it is
not easy to pinpoint why they were so interested in expansion in this di-
rection. For the church-based organisations, Murphy’s statement about
‘capturing souls’ seems anachronistic. Some recent research on NGOs
gives some insight into how faith-based organisations frame their mo-
tivations (Goodwin & Phillips 2011; Phillips & Goodwin 2013). Partic-
ipants tied the expansion of their organisations to mission, but referred
to a broad ‘social justice’ mission rather than a specifically religious
one. This framing very much overlapped with the agenda described
by participants from secular NFPs. Examples of responses about ex-
pansion from both types of organisations included: ‘It’s part of our
vision to improve the lives of vulnerable people’; ‘Our organisation has
a strong commitment to social justice’ and ‘because of a commitment
to social justice that comes out of our links to [a particular] church’
(quoted in Goodwin & Phillips 2011, p. 30). Thus the charities and
community-based organisations’ rationales for delivering government-
funded welfare services can be seen to converge: they are responsive,
flexible, have the capacity to innovate and they are motivated by social
justice principles.
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Marketisation of human services and NFP policy research
While the increased role of NFPs as human services providers has been
analysed in detail in the contemporary literature, one area of expansion
that has been less focused upon is the way that some NFPs in the sector
have grown their policy research activities. Since the 2000s, Australian
NFP human service organisations have been increasingly allocating re-
sources to policy research through the establishment of policy research
units and policy research positions. Indeed, most of the large charities
referred to above, as well as some smaller community-based organi-
sations, now have specialised units (sometimes referred to as ‘social
justice’ units), in which policy research is a central activity and pol-
icy researchers are key personnel. This development can be related to
marketisation in a number of ways. First, the professionalisation of or-
ganisations that accompanied NPM techniques of disciplining NFPs
resulted in the more regular employment of staff with research back-
grounds and research degrees: the change in workforce demanded by
the new requirements promoted an internal culture of developing a
research base that fitted with the external pressure from funders for
‘evidence’. Second, when governments began contracting out service
provision, they also began dismantling existing government research
and policy units that sat alongside the service provision programs,
opening a space and need for in-house research. As one policy re-
searcher explained:
Prior to contracting out, the departments used to do evaluations of
their programs. For example, governments had the data to ask ques-
tions such as whether training or work experience is more effective
in moving people into the workforce. Once services were contracted
out, they could no longer ask these questions because they weren’t
providing the services … the fact that government is no longer pro-
ducing evaluation research has created an opening for other players.
(quoted in Goodwin & Phillips 2011, p. 27)
A third rationale for the expansion of NFP policy research activities
relates directly to the competitive funding environment, which placed
pressure on organisations to gain reputational advantage with govern-
ment funders as well as with donors and other constituencies. This
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advantage could be gained through research production: conducting
policy research was seen to have ‘cachet’ with funders, and so was im-
portant for ‘branding’ the NFP as a serious player in the field of human
services (Goodwin & Phillips 2011, p. 28). Finally, the de-legitimising
of alternative forms of democratised decision-making, discussed above,
created a need for alternative ways of influencing policy processes. Pol-
icy research became an effective form of working for social justice in a
context where ‘evidence-based change’ was privileged over other forms
of community and consumer participation and social movement ac-
tivism (Goodwin & Phillips 2011, p. 31). Because NFPs had taken on
such a significant role in the human services market, their proximity
to end users meant they came to be regarded by government as hav-
ing important intelligence for social policy and, as such, were provided
opportunities to participate in policy processes via their research-based
practices. In addition, because NFPs are seen as ‘not being in it for the
money’, the evidence they produce is largely regarded as objective, or
at least more disinterested than for-profit providers. In the context of
marketisation, this final point, however, must be regarded as moot. As
can be seen, in the competition state, NFPs are in it for the money, even
if that money is for community stakeholders (which, as organisations
grow, includes organisational staff) rather than individual shareholders.
NFPs in the human services market: community, market or state
organisations?
The ostensibly powerful arguments about the distinctive nature and
role of NFPs in human services are, ironically, also precisely the argu-
ments that lose force as a result of the marketising processes described
in this chapter. For example, Kerry Brown and Robyn Keast (2005)
suggest that new ways of funding and providing social services may
have strengthened government control through the introduction of co-
ercive regulatory arrangements. Through these arrangements, services
are governed at a distance and this can have a stifling effect on NFP’s
putative capacity to innovate and be responsive to localised and in-
dividual circumstances. While NFPs continue to claim a base in ‘the
community’, their activities are increasingly constructed by government
as services for the community, rather than from the community.
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Similarly, contractualism and competitive tendering encourage
business-like practices in NFPs and orient them toward achieving the
best financial outcomes, rather than the best social outcomes. The so-
called gaming of performance measurement regimes (Pollitt 2007) by
both NFPs and for-profits and the professionalisation of government
contract tender writing are two examples of shifts in practices that blur
the boundaries between these two types of organisations. In its sub-
mission to the Productivity Commission inquiry into the not-for-profit
sector, the Brotherhood of St Laurence suggested that contracting out
‘led to the rise of mega not-for-profit and for-profit service delivery
agencies in the non-government welfare sector whose size and ag-
gressive business practices have sometimes crowded out and displaced
more traditional sector functions’ (2009, p. 3). Again, while NFPs con-
tinue to claim separateness from the market primarily through their
eschewal of a profit motive, in welfare markets they function as private
organisations, deploying market strategies.
One of the most highly contested aspects of outsourcing to NFPs
has been the use, by governments, of funding contracts to control criti-
cism of government policy, particularly the use of so-called gag clauses
(Maddison 2009, p. 26). This practice goes to the heart of the dis-
tinctiveness of NFPs as independent of government and advocates for
social justice. Under the Howard Coalition government, confidential-
ity clauses were a feature of many of the contracts drawn up between
the government and NFP service providers. These required organisa-
tions to seek approval of the funding agency before making public
comment and were similar to clauses applied in contracts with for-
profits, who were seen as ostensibly similar – as primarily contracted
service providers. The Gillard Labor government sought to overturn
this approach on the basis it supported a ‘strong and independent not-
for-profit sector’, and the Not For Profit Sector Freedom to Advocate Act
was enshrined in 2013. Interestingly, however, the Queensland gov-
ernment has maintained its position on confidentiality clauses, but for
different reasons. Its position is that where NFP organisations receive a
majority of their funding from government, they are, ‘to all intents and
purposes, government agencies. And, given that this is the case, it fol-
lows they should be subject to the same conditions that apply to any
other government agency’ (Thomas & Knowler 2013, p. 8).
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The positioning of NFPs as either quasi-private organisations or
quasi-government organisations in government-funded human ser-
vices markets works against the notion that they are civil society organ-
isations, formed voluntarily outside of the domains of the state, market
or family, and the NFP sector is grappling with reasserting its identity
as the third sector. Wright and colleagues (2011) contend that perhaps
the most significant, and most widely accepted, outcome of the con-
tracting out of human services to not-for-profit organisations is the
government’s appropriation of third sector discourses. They argue this
appropriation has led to the ‘automatic positioning’ of the state in an
‘unfavourable and undesirable light as a desirable arena of service pro-
vision’ (Wright et al. 2011, p. 303). This is perhaps the most radical way
in which the marketisation of NGOs has changed state–society rela-
tions.
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